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Abstract: Witchcraft-related violence (WRV), in particular directed towards women and 
children, has become a source of increasing concern for human rights organisations in the 
current century. Yet for those fleeing WRV this heightened attention has not translated across 
into refugee status. This research examines how claims of WRV were addressed in all available 
asylum decisions in English, drawn from five jurisdictions. We argue that WRV is a 
manifestation of gender-related harm; one which exposes major failings in the application of 
refugee jurisprudence. Inattention to the religious and organisational elements of witchcraft 
practices, combined with gender insensitivity in analysis, meant that claims were frequently 
re-configured by decision-makers as personal grudges, or family or community disputes, such 
that they were not cognisable harms within the terms of the Refugee Convention; or they 
were simply disbelieved as far-fetched. The success rate of claims was low, compared to 
available averages, and, when successful, claims were universally accepted on some basis 
other than the witchcraft element of the case. This article focuses in particular upon cases 
where the applicant feared harm as an accused witch, while a second related article addresses 
those fearing persecution from witches or through the medium of witchcraft.  
Introduction 
Witchcraft-related violence (WRV) has become a source of increasing concern for 
international human rights and aid organisations through much of the current century 
(Aguilar Molina, 2006; ActionAid, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2017). The US State 
Department reports 425 WRV deaths in Tanzania during 2015 alone (US DoS, 2017: 30). In 
recent years, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child and UN Committee on the 
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women have drawn attention to WRV 
directed towards women and children in their annual and country reports, (summarised in 
Hanson and Ruggiero, 2013: [2.2]) as have the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2002 
and 2012; Alston, 2009, 2012; United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 
2009;  United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016). More recently, both UNICEF and UNHCR 
have published a number of research reports, undertaken training and formed partnerships 
with local groups to respond to WRV, including that occurring within UNHCR’s own refugee 
camps (Cimpric, 2010; Nwadinobi, 2008; Schnoelbelen, 2009; Bussien et al, 2011; Powles and 
Deakin, 2012; Dols García, 2013). The focus of the international community has been almost 
exclusively on African states, although reports frequently acknowledge that WRV is not 
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limited to Africa, and also occurs in Nepal, India, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and some 
Central America states (Schnoelbelen, 2009: 22-26; European Asylum Support Office, 2015: 
2.5; Crisp 2008). 
 
This increased international attention to WRV has been accompanied by state-based 
initiatives that monitor and/or criminalise WRV, and in particular accusations of witchcraft, 
within their domestic jurisdictions (Larson, 2011; SALRC, 2016; Forsyth, 2016; Eves 2017). In 
parallel, some states in the Global North have also sought to combat local WRV through 
legislation, taskforces or policy reform initiatives (Bahkt and Palmer, 2015). Within the UK a 
special ‘faith based’ child abuse unit of the London Metropolitan Police, Project Violet, has 
existed since 2005, in response to a series of high profile deaths of children through exorcisms 
and witchcraft related rituals (Stobart, 2006; Schnoebelen, 2009: 29-31; BBC News, 2012, 
2014; Somos, 2017). Project Violet has contributed to a National Action Plan concerning 
responses to child abuse ‘linked to faith or belief’, primarily witchcraft and spirit possession; 
of which there are more than 30 documented cases each year (The National Working Group 
on Child Abuse Linked to Faith or Belief, 2012).  
 
Yet this heightened attention to WRV, in particular as a form of persecution that is directed 
largely toward women and children (Mgbako and Glenn, 2011), and the increasingly detailed 
documentation of the human rights abuses that have resulted from it, has not translated 
across into refugee decision-making. This is particularly striking given that the highest level 
interpretive guidance offered by UNHCR, the Guidelines on International Protection, draws 
attention to witchcraft beliefs and practices in two of its publications. UNHCR highlights the 
gendered nature of some forms of religious persecution with specific reference to the 
example of witchcraft in the Guidelines on Religion (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 2004: [24]), and mentions accusations of witchcraft as a risk faced by intersex 
children and their families in the Guidelines on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2012: [10]). i Moreover, the UNHCR Resettlement 
Handbook discusses WRV in the context of elder abuse of older women who have been 
‘maimed, ostracized or killed when labelled as witches in response to unexplained natural 
phenomena affecting communities’ (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011: 
195). 
 
This article examines WRV in modern refugee jurisprudence as a manifestation of gender-
related harm; one which exposes major failings in refugee jurisprudence and adjudication 
processes. In order to make a claim for refugee protection from another nation, a claimant 
must demonstrate that they have a well-founded fear of persecution based upon one of five 
protected grounds (race, religion, political opinion, nationality and particular social group) 
that their State of origin is unwilling or unable to protect them from (Hathaway and Foster, 
2014). In our analysis of WRV cases, systemic inattention to the scope of the Convention 
category of Religion, combined with gender insensitivity in analysis, meant that claims were 
frequently re-configured by decision-makers as personal grudges, or family or community 
disputes, such that they were not cognisable harms within Convention terms; or they were 
simply disbelieved as far-fetched. The success rate of claims was low, compared to available 
averages, and, when successful, claims were universally accepted on some basis other than 
the witchcraft element of the case.  
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Our data set provides a rich resource for exploring the gendered nature of WRV in refugee 
decision-making. The five countries from which cases are drawn — Australia, Canada, United 
Kingdom, United States and New Zealand — represent the major nations in which English 
language refugee jurisprudence is developed, albeit within divergent national frameworks. 
The analysis undertaken here is thematic, in that we sought to explore the ways in which 
claims of witchcraft related violence arose, and were addressed, in refugee adjudication 
broadly. While we did not seek to directly compare outcomes across jurisdictions, in particular 
because differential decision release policies meant that countries receiving smaller numbers 
of claims (Australia and Canada) had significantly more available decisions than larger 
receiving nations (UK and USA), there were no obvious or marked difference in approach 
across the different receiving nations.  
 
Elsewhere, Arbel, Dauvergne and Millbank have suggested that gender-related persecution 
jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘mosaic’ in which disparate and highly specific pieces fit 
together to form a global picture of asylum systems responses to violence; that is, that 
recognition of the particularities of specific kinds of claims, such as forced marriage, or claims 
from certain places, should be examined as both unique and connected phenomenon (2014). 
Witchcraft claims exemplify the need for such an approach. They are highly specific in terms 
of the lived experiences of WRV and witchcraft practices, but also exemplify broadly typical 
elements of gendered refugee claims, including characterisations of claims within the PSG 
category to the exclusion of other Convention grounds, of private realm harms as domestic 
or personal, and also exemplify the ontological crisis posed by RSD more broadly – as decision-
makers struggle with the unknown, unknowable Other. Witchcraft claims illuminate and allow 
for new insights into these broader questions, while also deserving of analysis in their own 
right as a very specific kind of claim.  
 
Taking the collection of WRV asylum claims as whole, the numbers of male and female 
claimants are roughly equal. This in itself is noteworthy, as men make up the vast majority of 
refugee claimants in receiving countries worldwide – reflecting their greater access to 
resources enabling them to travel. Of the five jurisdictions represented, only the UK publishes 
statistics that are disaggregated by gender; in 2014, 73 per cent of asylum applicants in the 
UK were men (2015: Table 8). When dividing our case set according to whether witchcraft 
appeared as the target or method of persecution, the picture is even more starkly gendered. 
Cases in which the applicant claimed persecution as an accused or imputed witch comprised 
almost two-thirds female applicants (of whom nine had one or more children attached to the 
main application, and one case involved a female child as the main applicant). In contrast, 
those claiming to have been persecuted through witchcraft were over two thirds male (and 
none had a child attached). ii  
 
This research project thus addressed all WRV asylum claims as gender related harms, but 
divided the analysis into two related publications: this one examining claims where the mostly 
female applicants faced persecution on the basis of being accused of being witches, followed 
by a second publication concerning the mostly male claimants who feared persecution 
through the medium of witchcraft. Although there are some common elements in the cases, 
this division recognises the different ways that gender plays out in asylum claims, reasoning 
and outcomes. So for example, a significant portion of the cases with male applicants fearing 
witchcraft concerned issues of communal status or control, connected with inheritance 
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disputes over land or chieftaincy. These claims were gendered in masculine ways; men were 
resisting, or were seen to be non-conforming with, dominant expectations of masculinity 
within the public realm. In a virtual mirror image, the cases with women accused of witchcraft, 
like female applicants more broadly, were more likely to involve private-realm harms at the 
hands of family or partners, and gendered types of harm, such as forced marriage, domestic 
violence, genital cutting or rape. In addition, the jurisprudential challenges posed by each kind 
of claim were distinct, in particular that men fearing witchcraft faced acute difficulties in 
defining any kind of PSG, and in making out the objective element of fear. These factors merit 
separate discussion of these related case sets involving WRV.  
 
This article first provides a brief account of what is meant by witchcraft, then gives an 
overview of the entire WRV dataset and outlines the main features of the accused of 
witchcraft cases that are addressed here, before going on to examine the ways in which 
accusations of witchcraft ought to be (but largely are not) understood as gender based harm 
in refugee status determination (RSD) systems. Finally, we examine how WRV falls within the 
scope of both religious persecution and PSG as grounds for protection under the Refugee 
Convention. In the second article, concerning fear of witchcraft, we take up the issue of how 
WRV fits within the religion ground in more detail. 
 
Understanding Witchcraft Beliefs and Practices  
The representative [said he] has seen someone beaten to death when someone dies. 
A person is attacked to confess, to apportion blame. In most cases families disown 
those accused of witchcraft. If something bad happens, for example if one’s company 
starts to decline, often people will go to a native doctors and look for someone to 
blame. The police will not do anything about it (1202540 [2012] RRTA 473 [59]). 
 
Witchcraft forms an integral part of everyday life in many parts of the world, influencing how 
people understand the world and their place within it. A survey of ‘Traditional African 
Religious Beliefs and Practices’ found that a majority of respondents from Cameroon, DRC, 
Ghana, Mali, Rwanda, South Africa and Tanzania answered ‘yes’ to the question ‘Do you 
believe in witchcraft?’ (Pew Forum, 2010: 178). ‘Witchcraft’ is an umbrella term for beliefs 
and practices concerning supernatural powers and objects, which vary widely across 
communities, regions and time (Pavanello, 2017). Francis Nyamnjoh, for example, has 
characterised witchcraft as cosmological ‘order that marries the so-called natural and 
supernatural, rational and irrational, objective and subjective, scientific and superstitious, 
visible and invisible, real and unreal’ (2001: 28, 29). Early anthropologists, most notably E E 
Evans-Pritchard in his foundational study of Zande people in Sudan, sought to categorise 
different understandings of the occult in local contexts, drawing a principal distinction 
between notions of witchcraft, sorcery and magic. According to Evans-Pritchard, witchcraft 
refers to an inherited physical ‘substance in the body of witches’, whereas sorcery requires 
the skilful use of physical objects and substances to act upon the physical world with a 
conscious intent to cause harm (Evans-Pritchard, 1937: 1). Both witchcraft and sorcery have 
destructive capacities and could be invoked to provide rational explanations for the 
occurrence of misfortunate events. (For Evans-Pritchard, these can be contrasted to notions 
to ‘good magic’ that are deployed to protect against occult forms of danger.)  
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Such distinctions have provided a useful, albeit at times overlooked, analytics for attending 
to the different meanings of occult forces in locally-specific contexts. Yet, such categorisations 
have given rise to problems of translation and comparability. On the one hand, scholars in a 
range of settings have long noted that local lexicons for the occult do not directly equate with 
the English term ‘witchcraft’ or the French term sorcellerie and that the meanings conveyed 
through local terms cannot be fully captured through the words witchcraft or sorcery (Moore 
and Sanders, 2001). Rather, the idiom of ‘witchcraft’ is a distinctly European term that came 
to be used to understand non-European cosmologies through a variety of colonial practices, 
including legislation outlawing ‘witchcraft’ beliefs and practices. Such state endeavours 
framed local beliefs and practices as threatening and harmful, largely reducing them to their 
apparently ‘ugly core’ (Geschiere, 1997: 13). As a result, as Miranda Forsyth notes, the terms 
witchcraft and sorcery have been ‘widely criticised as being derogatory or neo-colonial, 
referencing inappropriate European traditions, and failing to identify the highly diverse range 
of practices and beliefs at stake’ in different understandings of the occult (Forsyth, 2016: 4.3). 
Despite this, the idiom of witchcraft remains significant. First, the terminology of witchcraft 
is used by asylum seekers themselves in expressing their claims in RSD processes, and 
secondly it is the framework of decision-makers that we are analysing here. 
 
Indigenous understandings of occult forces have not remained static since colonial times, and 
been transformed through processes of state-making, urbanisation, and migration (Moore 
and Sanders, 2001: 5; Ciekawy, 1998). Local lexicons of the occult have come to borrow from 
neighbouring discourses as well as appropriate Eurocentric terms such as witchcraft. Thus, 
Peter Geschiere has argued that witchcraft discourses have become ubiquitous, mobilised 
both in public discourse and by people themselves as part of their everyday lives. For 
Geschiere, witchcraft as a term is thus ‘extremely slippery’ and highly dynamic: at once 
omnipresent and adaptable to changing social relations while also generally understood to 
have a common core (Geschiere, 1997, 2013: xvi). As Katherine Luongo has noted, scholars 
have come to ‘regard witchcraft as an evolving process rather than a fixed set of practices, as 
situated in a resonant history rather than in an anthropological present, and as a lived 
experience rather than an abstract imaginary’: she notes that research since the 1980s has 
demonstrated an ‘interpenetration’ of witchcraft, law and politics in Africa (Luongo, 2015: 
186). 
 
Anthropologists have shown how social, economic and political transformations brought on 
by new technologies and new forms of circulation in parts of Africa, for example, have given 
rise to profound anxieties about what it means to be ‘living in a world of witches’ (Ashforth, 
2015). Jean and John Comaroff have argued that ‘occult economies’ have taken on a new 
prominence in contemporary postcolonial societies (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000). As a 
result, some communities have experienced an upsurge in witchcraft accusations as a way of 
responding to inequalities in wealth and power. This has given rise to a new anti-witchcraft 
politics that manifested in new and protean practices of witchcraft-finding and eradication. 
The proliferation of witchcraft beliefs and practices is thus a distinctly modern phenomenon, 
and should be understood as one way that people ‘define their moral and social universe and 
then act upon those definitions in a rapidly changing world’ (Ciekawy and Geschiere, 1998: 
3). However Luongo argues that refugee decision-makers in witchcraft-related asylum cases 
have mobilised the idea of witchcraft with ‘an uncomfortable ahistoricity and an awkward 
detachment from institutions’ (Luongo, 2015: 187).  
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Witchcraft in Refugee Cases 
Searching the terms ‘witch*’, ‘witchcraft’, ‘black magic’, ‘occult’, ‘sorcery’ and ‘exorcism’ 
unearthed 176 written refugee decisions over 14 years from five jurisdictions where 
references to witchcraft beliefs or practices appeared as part of an asylum seeker’s claim.iii 
The decisions include determinations across all levels, although the bulk of the case set (103 
decisions) is made up of merits determinations, where a tribunal decision-maker considered 
the claimants’ substantive grounds for asylum.iv The cases appeared in Australia (79 
decisions), Canada (70 decisions), New Zealand (3 decisions), the United Kingdom (16 
decisions) and the United States (8 decisions) from 1993 to 2016 (inclusive).v Although these 
decisions represent only a fraction of those decided, they are comparable to other large scale 
national (Baillot, Cowan, & Munro, 2014; Arbel, 2013; McKinnon, 2016; MacIntosh, 2009; 
Kneebone, 2005) and international comparative studies of RSD (Dauvergne and Millbank, 
2010; Millbank, 2009) and represent a significant advance in knowledge through collecting 
together such cases for the first time.  
 
Across all jurisdictions, by far the most common country of origin for claimants raising 
witchcraft claims was Nigeria, comprising 46 cases from the total pool of 176.vi Other common 
countries of origin included Cameroon, Ghana, Indonesia and Tanzania.vii Within the sub-set 
of cases involving claimants accused of witchcraft the country picture shifts slightly: Nigeria is 
still overwhelmingly the main country of origin (with 26 cases), followed by Nepal (5), Ghana, 
Indonesia, Kenya and Zimbabwe (3 each); Benin, Cameroon, Fiji, the Philippines and Uganda 
(2 each); and China, DRC, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, India, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Pakistan, 
PNG, South Korea and Vanuatu (1 each). The omission of Tanzania is particularly striking given 
the high levels of violence against women accused of witchcraft reported by NGOs (Makoye, 
2017; HelpAge, 2017). It is also notable that PNG has very high levels of reported WRV 
(Forsyth, 2016; Eves, 2017) yet there were no available decisions concerning PNG asylum 
seekers in Australia on the basis of an accusation of witchcraft (Wallace, 2016). These 
omissions underscore the fact that refugee decisions do not necessarily represent refugee 
experiences.  
 
The vast majority of decisions were negative, in that the claimant was not granted asylum or 
judicial review of an earlier negative asylum determination. Of the total 176 decisions, only 
22 per cent were counted as positive in that the claimant succeeded in the outcome they 
sought. For merits decisions, this was slightly lower, with only around 16.5 per cent of cases 
successful. Success rates are notoriously difficult to calculate across jurisdictions, but this 
appears to be somewhat lower than available averages in positive outcomes for tribunal level 
refugee determinations generally.viii When viewed against positive rates in comparable data-
sets of gender related refugee cases, such as those concerning forced marriage, sexual 
orientation or gender identity, in the same receiving countries over similar time-frames, the 
positive rate for WRV claims appears low.ix In common with many gender related refugee 
claims, a major hurdle that claimants faced, across both groups of WRV claims, was that of 
satisfying credibility and evidentiary requirements. We found that credibility in particular 
formed a key basis for rejection of claims based on witchcraft accusations.  
 
As noted in the Introduction, the decisions fall into two quite different kinds of claims: those 
where an applicant fears harm on the basis of being accused of practising witchcraft or related 
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activities (including black magic, sorcery and other occult practices), and claims where an 
applicant fears harm through witchcraft practices or related activities. Interestingly, the 
majority of decisions concerned claims where the applicant feared harm through witchcraft 
practices (62 per cent of the overall case set), while a minority concerned claims based on 
accusations of witchcraft directed towards the claimant (38 per cent).  
 
The division between these two categories was not always clear cut. This was made 
particularly apparent by the fact that the 10 claims by gay men and lesbians straddled the 
divide, depending upon how they were articulated. That is: an applicant might have said that 
as a lesbian she was attacked as a witch, or that those who attacked her attempted to ‘cure’ 
her through sending her to the witchdoctor, or that her sexuality was understood as a form 
of bewitchment, or some combination of the above. While the first claim is readily 
categorised as accused of witchcraft, the latter two are more ambiguously fear of witchcraft, 
and any combination of the claims defies the divide altogether. Nevertheless we argue that 
the distinction between accusations of witchcraft and fear of witchcraft is a useful one in that 
it broadly represents a gendered pattern of claim, and because the jurisprudential challenges 
raised by each are markedly distinct.   
 
Once disaggregated for gender and kind of claim, a complex picture emerges. There were 66 
cases where the applicant feared harm on the basis of being accused of witchcraft, with a 
positive rate of 26 per cent (which was roughly the same at merits and judicial review levels).x 
While the majority of claimants on the basis of accusations of witchcraft were female, it is 
notable that they were dramatically more likely to record a positive result at the merits level 
than were male applicants: of the 21 initial cases brought by women, 7 decisions (or 33 per 
cent) were successful; in contrast, of the 12 initial claims brought by men, only one (or 8 per 
cent) was successful. However even in successful cases, decision-makers framed the grounds 
for granting asylum around other additional, or interconnected, factors in the claim. We argue 
that this evinces a tendency, in both successful and unsuccessful decisions, to treat 
accusations of witchcraft as peripheral and to actively search for other grounds or forms of 
harm to base the decision on. This was borne out in multiple ways: in the defining of the 
Convention ground, including the exclusion of Religion and the framing of the PSG to highlight 
other aspects of the claimant’s identity, deflecting attention from the WRV towards other 
persecutory acts, characterising WRV as personal in motivation such that there was no nexus 
between the harm feared and a Convention ground, or disbelieving part, or all, of the claim. 
We contend that these cases demonstrate that witchcraft is an ontological challenge within 
RSD; one which could have been addressed through the application of well-established 
jurisprudence on imputed Convention grounds, but was instead avoided, displaced and 
dismissed.  
Accusations of Witchcraft as Gendered Persecution 
This section lays out the ways in which accusations of witchcraft cases were gendered, in 
particular through the frame of relationality, and how the personal, ‘private’ and emotional 
dimensions of claims were understood as apart from, rather than intertwined with, 
understandings of witchcraft in RSD.  Witchcraft related violence throws into stark relief the 
enduring tension between the exotic and the prosaic in gender related refugee claims. 
Feminist commentators have long argued that Western RSD systems have disproportionately 
focused on eroticised harms such as FGM and so-called honour killing, which are seen to 
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present public and ‘cultural’ dimensions oppositional to the receiving State. This focus has 
been at the expense of recognition of every-day harms such as family violence and sexual 
assault, which are dismissed as domestic, privately motivated and/or a problem ‘here too’ 
(Macklin, 1995; Razack, 1995; Dauvergne and Millbank 2010). As Carol Bohmer and Amy 
Shuman have argued, this places applicants in an almost impossible position wherein asylum 
claims based on perceived ‘exotic, abhorrent acts of persecution are both more recognized 
as persecution and more susceptible to the suspicion’ of decision-makers (Bohmer and 
Shuman, 2007: 210).   
 
Asylum claims based on WRV take us to the outer edge of this paradox. Claims concerning 
witchcraft are so deeply exoticised that they distinguish the applicant as an unusual individual 
worthy of attention (and the national culture from which they fled so pre-modern as to merit 
protection from it); yet the occult elements of the claims are so unintelligible to Western 
decision-makers that there is a very real danger that the claimant will be disbelieved, or the 
witchcraft claims excluded. The elision of the witchcraft elements of the claim was very much 
a feature of the cases we examined in this research. Forms of WRV were viewed as 
individualised and exoticised beliefs and events, disconnected from social institutions and 
national politics, and were largely ignored in favour of more concrete and cognisable forms 
of harm or grounds of persecution. The failure to believe or understand these claims may be 
a result of failing to associate witchcraft with ‘public’ or political questions, and an association 
of witchcraft with domestic, feminised and private disputes.  
 
In cases concerning accusations of witchcraft against women, like women’s asylum claims 
more broadly, claimants often appeared and were defined through their familial relationships 
(as mothers, wives or as widows) and this radiated through an RSD process in which their 
experiences of harm were more likely to be framed as personally motivated rather than 
Convention based. The persecuting agents in the cases we examined were most frequently 
members of the claimants’ own family or close kin. Anthropologist Peter Geschiere has 
referred to witchcraft as ‘the dark side of kinship’ as it frequently arises within the domestic 
realities and ‘intimacy of the family and the home’ (Geschiere, 1997: 11; see also Geschiere, 
2013). This widespread characterisation of WRV as domestic or ‘private’ in nature has meant 
that claimants frequently struggled to establish nexus with the Convention ground, and to 
demonstrate a lack of State protection.  
 
When an express personal motivation or object was narrated as part of the accusation of 
witchcraft – for example that the accuser was jealous of the victim or hoped for some material 
gain from the accusation – this could be fatal to the claim. Katherine Luongo gives the example 
of a Canadian case, Fatoyinbo (2012), in which the Tribunal determined that the son-in-law’s 
accusation of witchcraft against the applicant was a ‘simple vendetta’, not persecution for 
Convention reasons. This case illustrates a profound failure of understanding, both of 
practices of witchcraft accusation and of gender-related persecution.  
Anthropologists and historians have stressed that witchcraft accusations perform multiple 
social functions; they do not exist apart from community norms, and tensions (Chaudhuri, 
2012), nor from affective registers, in particular jealousy, anger, mistrust, envy and fear 
(Luongo 2015; Powles and Deakin 2012; Mgbako and Glenn 2011). Powles and Deakin note 
that: 
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Witchcraft accusations are made and sustained by the exercise of power in a 
community through cultural discourses and practices…Sometimes a witchcraft 
accusation will serve the interests of one person over another, securing them access 
to land, property, or social advantage (Powles and Deakin 2012: 16). 
 
Gender-related persecution often takes place in private settings with known assailants, who 
act with private, or mixed, motivations: it is the failure of State protection that transforms 
this into a Convention harm (Hathaway and Foster, 2014: [5.3]). Private settings, and/or 
motives, should not blind RSD to structural exercises of power. Luongo argues that in the case 
of Fatoyinbo, and others like it, decision-makers saw hostile speech and acts in family settings 
without understanding the profound and life-threatening social effect that an accusation of 
witchcraft may have for an applicant. She says: 
It occludes the ways in which witchcraft is socially saturating and thus how 
accusations of witchcraft have a power that other hostile speech acts and other kinds 
of threat do not. Within the social world that Fatoyinbo had inhabited, allegations 
about her witchcraft practice fundamentally remade her identity, transforming her 
from a mother, kinswoman, and neighbour into a serial killer in the eyes of her 
associates (Luongo, 2015: 192, emphasis added). 
 
It was striking that many of claims in our case set were narrated, and understood, in relation 
to the institution of marriage – that is, women were accused as witches, or were at 
heightened risk, because they were widowed, or had refused a claim of marriage. Notably, 
even when decision-makers did characterise the case as one involving gender-related harm, 
it was almost always the other gendered dimensions which were addressed. For example, in 
a 2010 Canadian decision that granted asylum to a Nigerian woman, the Tribunal focused on 
the issue of forced marriage, while overlooking the witchcraft accusations (X (Re), 2000 CanLII 
21442). The case concerned a widow who was accused of being a witch by her husband’s 
family following the untimely death of her husband. In order to clear her name, her husband’s 
family forced the applicant to engage in certain rituals, including sleeping next to her dead 
husband and drinking water in which he had been bathed (she refused to participate in the 
latter ritual on account of being pregnant and her Christian belief). The family also wanted 
the applicant to marry her brother-in-law, whom she claimed was a polygamist. The applicant 
described herself as a Christian and her husband’s family as ‘pagans’ and claimed that her 
husband’s family would kill her if she returned to Nigeria as they ‘branded her a witch’. 
Unusually, the Tribunal granted the claimant asylum on the interrelated grounds of religion 
and membership of a particular social group, but it did not specify what the particular social 
group was in its reasoning and focused its brief reasoning on the documentary evidence on 
‘deep-rooted’ practice of levirate marriages in Nigerian society. As a result, the specificity of 
witchcraft accusations as a particular form of gendered harm remained unrecognised or 
unarticulated within the Tribunal’s reasoning.  
 
Women’s claims were also gendered and relational in that WRV against children produced 
female applicants who were either fleeing harm directed towards their child as an accused 
witch, or an accusation of witchcraft which encompassed them as a witch by reason of their 
relationship to the child. There were no comparable cases in the dataset by male claimants. 
In a report for UNICEF on witchcraft allegations specifically against children in Africa, Cimpric 
suggests that these can be divided into three distinct categories: the first concerning 
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vulnerable children, often orphaned or homeless, with physical disability or unusual 
behaviours that mark them out as visibly ‘different’; the second is children who are known as 
the ‘badly born’ with physical disability or uncommon birth events, and the third are children 
with albinism (Cimpric, 2010).  Although Cimpric, and some others, distinguish people with 
albinism from the ‘badly born’ on the basis that they are not seen as witches per se but rather 
as witchcraft materiale (as they are at high risk of being killed or maimed for body parts in a 
number of countries for sale and use in witchcraft practices), other suggest that this 
distinction is not so clear cut, and that people with albinism are also perceived as witches in 
some places.   
 
In our study, there were four cases where a woman sought asylum for herself and her child 
on the basis of the child’s autism or albinism such that the child was perceived as a witch, or 
was at risk for their ‘magical qualities’. All four applications failed. Decision-makers 
characterised these claims, and country evidence, as about disability rather than examining 
them as issues of witchcraft triggered by physical or behavioural difference. For example, the 
case of Shitta before the UK Tribunal concerned a woman from Nigeria whose daughter had 
severe autism. The mother as the main applicant claimed that her daughter’s lack of speech 
and general hyperactivity had been interpreted by her husband’s family to indicate that the 
child was a witch and that the child’s extended family had attempted to harm her. In rejecting 
the claim, the First-tier Tribunal judge emphasised that there were several organisations 
dedicated to caring for and treating people with autism in Nigeria and also noted that 
although autistic children may be ‘unkindly treated’, ‘that is not the whole picture. The 
appellant herself conceded that something like half of the very large population of her 
parent’s church were kind and sympathetic in their responses’ (First-tier Tribunal 
Determination, quoted in Shitta v SSHD (Upper Tribunal IAC, Appeal AA/00832/2013, 29 July 
2013) [14]). In this reasoning, the specificity of the danger in relation to the witchcraft 
accusation disappears. 
 
It is not necessarily only adjudicators, but also advocates who may be involved in this process 
of excluding or minimising witchcraft, or sidelining what are seen to be inexplicably exotic 
elements of claims. In one Australian Tribunal case, the decision-maker asked the claimant’s 
advisor during the hearing to nominate their preferred option in relation to a number of 
different yet overlapping social group claims put forward on behalf of the claimant. The 
advisor opted for the narrowest formulation of the particular social group, namely ‘widowed 
Ugandan women in relation to whom a bride price has been paid’, de-emphasising other 
options such as ‘women’ in Uganda. Strikingly, though, none of the four possible formulations 
included any reference to the accusation of witchcraft made against the claimant by her 
brother-in-law, who was also the man to whom she would be forcibly married (V04/16971 
[2005] RRTA 351).    
 
It is ironic that Lawrance and Walker-Said (2016), and others such as Dauvergne and Millbank 
(2010), have documented the erasure of forced marriage in asylum claims, yet in our WRV 
case set there was a marked tendency towards a focus on the risk of forced marriage as the 
basis for refugee status, instead of witchcraft accusations. This tendency is evident, for 
example, in a 2015 New Zealand decision concerning a Malawian woman who was granted 
asylum on the basis of being pressured to marry her brother-in-law following the death of her 
husband (AB (Malawi) [2015] NZIPT 800672). The claimant had been subject to repeated 
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physical and emotional abuse by her deceased husband, his other wives and his family, 
including one of her husband’s sons accusing her of being a witch. This claim was also 
characterised as one about forced marriage rather than witchcraft, despite the accusation of 
witchcraft being a pivotal element of the coercion.xi We suggest that decision-makers typically 
reached for the part of the claim most intelligible to them: forced marriage rather than 
witchcraft; FGM rather than forced marriage, and so on.  
 
In a number of cases analysed, the witchcraft dimension of the narrative was not sidelined 
but rather met with open incredulity, often at the cost of the claim. For example, in a 2011 
Canadian case, the Tribunal rejected a Nigerian woman’s claim of having been accused of 
being a witch as part of a broader pattern of domestic violence. The woman said she had 
suffered horrific and sustained abuse from her husband, including rape and beatings until she 
was unconscious. This abuse included her husband accusing her of being a witch because he 
had been unable to kill her (X Re [2011] CanLII 100759). In rejecting the claim, the Tribunal 
determined that her testimony was inconsistent and not credible as her ‘allusions to 
witchcraft’ were ‘embellishments’. The decision-maker placed particular weight on the fact 
that the claimant had argued in her Port of Entry interview that she was applying for asylum 
on the basis that her husband considered her to be a witch and also that he would force her 
to be circumcised in order for her to produce a male child; but she had not mentioned the 
circumcision claim in her subsequent written statement. The decision-maker did not consider 
it reasonable that such a ‘serious’ matter would have ‘slipped her mind’. Within Western RSD 
processes, FGM is a very significant claim; witchcraft is not – thus the applicant’s reverse 
priorities were proof of falsehood rather than of a very different experience of life or different 
understanding of the threats that she faced.  
 
A 2014 Australian case illustrates how deeply embedded, and unevidenced assumptions 
about witchcraft form the basis for disbelief of claims. The applicant, a Nepali woman, claimed 
that she was accused of witchcraft by her estranged father-in-law and subjected to domestic 
violence by her husband because he believed that she was a witch. The woman lived for many 
years in Singapore with her husband and two children, and returned regularly to Nepal. In 
2011, after her father-in-law told her husband that the applicant was a witch who had caused 
her mother-in-law to fall ill, her husband started physically abusing her. This included 
threatening to kill her because he believed that she was a witch. The applicant claimed that 
she feared that she would be ‘stigmatised by society as a witch and be the first to be blamed 
if anyone were to fall sick’ and that she would not receive police protection against domestic 
violence (1305413 [2014] RRTA 393 [17]). In its decision, the Tribunal disbelieved the 
woman’s claims about the accusations of witchcraft and as a consequence also rejected the 
domestic violence claim. The decision-maker did not find it: 
plausible that her husband … who had lived and worked in highly-developed Singapore 
for 13 years, would be influenced by village superstition about witchcraft 
notwithstanding submissions by the applicant’s advisers that such a mindset can 
persist (SZUOB v MIBP [2015] FCA 752 [8]).  
 
In making this assessment, the decision-maker equated witchcraft practices and beliefs with 
implicitly pre-modern and rural ‘superstition’, such that it was inherently ‘implausible’ for a 
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person living in an urban metropole to believe in, and accuse another person of, witchcraft. 
This case was unusual in that it was the subject of a judicial review application, based on the 
argument that the applicant was denied natural justice through the decision-maker’s ‘lack of 
Nepalese cultural awareness’ and their having taken irrelevant considerations into account. 
However the appellate judge held that such a finding was open to the Tribunal, as it was ‘not 
based on any misunderstandings of relevant cultural attitudes, but the inconsistency in the 
applicant’s own evidence’ (SZUOB, 2015: [43]). Both the Tribunal and subsequent Court 
decision demonstrate a particular understanding of witchcraft that is so unassailable it does 
not require an evidentiary basis.  
Accusations of Witchcraft as Religious Persecution 
Karen Musalo has noted in her analysis of religion as a Convention ground for protection 
claims in the USA, ‘depending on who is doing the categorizing, other communities of belief 
may not readily be recognized as religions or beliefs coming within the parameters of the 
international norm of protection’ (2004: 168). Yet the UNHCR Guidelines on Religion note at 
the outset that there is no ‘universally accepted definition of Religion’ and go on to state that 
refugee claims on religion may involve religion as belief (including non-belief); religion as 
identity and religion as a way of life (2004: [4],[5]). In Europe this issue was specifically 
addressed in 2004 by the EC Minimum Standards Qualification Directive (and affirmed in the 
2011 re-cast) which provides a broad definition of the religion ground in Article 10(1)(b)as 
follows: 
[t]he concept of religion shall in particular include the holding of theistic, non-theistic 
and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private 
or public, either alone or in community with others, other religious acts or expressions 
of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any 
religious belief (2004, 2011). 
 
Overwhelmingly, scholarly literature and research on witchcraft in the fields of anthropology 
and sociology associate it with cultural and religious practices. Given this, one might expect 
that religion would be invoked by asylum seekers and/or considered by decision-makers as a 
viable ground for protection for WRV under the Refugees Convention. We suggest that 
consideration of religion as a ground could, and should, encompass the gendered nature of 
WRV. Notably the UNHCR Guidelines on Religion state: 
Particular attention should be paid to the impact of gender on religion-based refugee 
claims, as women and men may fear or suffer persecution for reasons of religion in 
different ways to each other. … These practices may be culturally condoned in the 
claimant’s community of origin but still amount to persecution. … When, due to the 
claimant’s gender, State actors are unwilling or unable to protect the claimant from 
such treatment, it should not be mistaken as a private conflict, but should be 
considered as valid grounds for refugee status (2004: [24]). 
 
Moreover, established international refugee jurisprudence holds that a claimant’s imputed 
belief or identity is sufficient to satisfy the Convention grounds, and that the claimant need 
not actually belong to a particular religious group or sincerely hold a particular religious belief 
(Hathaway and Foster, 2014: [5.8.2]).xii The majority of cases involving witchcraft accusations 
appear to concern imputed identities and practices, rather than a claimant’s actual practices 
of witchcraft or avowed beliefs. It is also well accepted in law that religious persecution can 
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occur because of the absence of religious identification with the persecutors’ beliefs, ie 
because the victim is seen as irreligious or belonging to a belief system opposed to the religion 
of the persecutor, as an apostate, atheist, sinner or in other respects anti-orthodox (Hathaway 
and Foster, 2014: [5.7]. See also the guide prepared for decision-makers within the refugee 
determination branch of the Australian Tribunal which lists persecution for reasons of religion 
as including transgressing social mores, conversion, apostasy and mixed marriage, AAT, 2016: 
Chapter 5 [5.13]-[5.16]). Thus the religion ground under the Convention appears a logical 
category of analysis for WRV.  
 
However we found only a handful of cases in which applicants articulated claims to asylum 
on the basis of religion, and of these most were explicitly or implicitly dismissed in the text of 
the decision.xiii For example in a 2013 Canadian decision a woman from Benin claimed that 
her employer (in Canada) has falsely accused her of being a witch (based on a dream that the 
employer had which was interpreted to mean that the claimant was possessed by ‘evil 
spirits’). The applicant claimed asylum on the basis of ‘imputed religious practice as a witch’ 
as well as imputed membership of a particular social group, namely ‘women in Benin who 
practice witchcraft’ (X (Re), 2013 CanLII 97281 (23 July 2013) [11]). Although the claimant’s 
employer had informed others within their community in Canada of the witchcraft accusation, 
the decision-maker found there was ‘no reasonable chance’ that the claimant would be 
persecuted as ‘claimant’s subjective fear of persecution has no objective basis…it is evident 
that the claimant is not a witch and would not be considered a witch should she return to 
Benin’ (emphasis added, [16]). The evidentiary link between not being a witch and not being 
perceived as one was not examined in the decision. Likewise in a claim by a Nigerian woman 
accused of witchcraft, the Canadian Tribunal held, ‘[w]hile the agent of harm may accuse the 
claimant of witchcraft, there is no reliable evidence before me that witchcraft exists or that 
the claimant is a witch who caused the road accident’ (X (Re), 2011 CanLII 97207). 
 
In fact, we found only one successful decision where religion was recognised as the ground 
for granting refugee status in a claim involving a person being accused of using occult forces. 
The 1998 Australian decision concerned a Chinese heterosexual married couple in which the 
wife was a well-known Qigong practitioner. The Tribunal found that both the female applicant 
and her husband had a well-founded fear of persecution owing to the Convention reasons of 
religion and/or imputed political opinion (N97/14401 [1998] RRTA 2861). While the decision-
maker noted that perceptions of Qigong differed in China, with it being ‘considered a science, 
a medicinal or health procedure, an emerging religion, a feudal superstition, a quackery, or 
even a potential political threat’, she accepted that Chinese authorities may become 
‘suspicious of any group beyond their control, and depending on the circumstances the 
authorities may see those groups as constituting a clear challenge’. Additionally, country 
information on China suggested that Qigong practitioners had been imprisoned on the basis 
of ‘conducting occult activities or feudal superstition’. In framing the perception and 
treatment of Qigong in China in this way, the decision-maker did not go as far as to label 
Qigong as a religion. Rather, she found that the applicant considered her activities as a Qigong 
practitioner as a ‘legitimate practice of her religion’ and recognised that the Chinese 
authorities similarly ‘perceived her activities in part as religious’.  
 
This kind of reasoning, examining the social context as one in which authorities and 
institutions generate an imputation of political and/or religious opposition, could equally 
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apply across many of the later WRV cases from African countries where the applicant was 
seen as a threat to the local or wider social order by virtue of being accused of witchcraft. Yet 
this did not occur. Significantly, there was no case in the entire dataset in which a decision-
maker granted asylum on the basis that witchcraft per se was a religion, or imputed religious 
belief, for the purposes of establishing a Convention ground or nexus. 
Accused Witches as a Particular Social Group  
Particular Social Group is the Convention category in which most gender-related claims are 
determined. This Convention ground is both more conceptually challenging, and less 
coherent, than the other grounds of race, religion, political opinion and nationality (Foster 
2014). The history of the development of the PSG category has involved two divided schools 
of thought about the basis for the definition (innate, immutable or essential characteristics 
versus social perception of a group) and attempts to cohere the divergent approaches 
effectively raised the bar in some receiving states to require both approaches (Foster, 2014: 
18-22). In practice, regardless of which approach is utilised, tangled attempts to define the 
group in gender related cases have led to demonstrated past failures of analysis about nexus, 
persecutor motivation, and failures of state protection and provided space for ‘privatising’ 
impulses wherein the risk of harm faced by the applicant was characterised as unconnected 
to wider political, religious and social forces (Foster, 2014; Dauvergne and Millbank 2010; 
Labman and Dauvergne, 2014; Cheikh Ali, Querton and Soulard, 2012; Millbank, 2013; 
Honkala, 2017).  
 
As with religion, refugee jurisprudence recognises that it is sufficient to be imputed with 
particular characteristics to be recognised as a PSG. In a 1997 Australian High Court decision, 
McHugh J actually gave ‘witches’ as an example when discussing the legal requirements of a 
particular social group: 
A group may qualify as a particular social group, however, even though the 
distinguishing features of the group do not have a public face. It is sufficient that the 
public is aware of the characteristics or attributes that, for the purposes of the 
Convention, unite and identify the group. … Nor is it necessary that the group should 
possess the attributes that they are perceived to have. Witches were a particular social 
group in the society of their day, notwithstanding that the attributes that identified 
them as a group were often based on the fantasies of others and a general community 
belief in witchcraft (Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 265).  
 
Despite high level acceptance in policy, legislation and case law, under both the PSG 
approaches, that “women” are a PSG, “women” is rarely the category of claim or analysis in 
gender-related claims. In her comprehensive international analysis of PSG jurisprudence 
Michelle Foster notes that lower level decision-makers in many countries continually redefine 
and narrow the PSG in gender based claims (2014; see also Kneebone, 2005; Dauvergne and 
Millbank, 2010: 28-32). Our data set reflected this finding, with only one successful case 
raising claims of WRV in which the relevant PSG was stated to be “women”. In a New Zealand 
Tribunal decision, a Malawian woman was granted asylum on the basis of her deceased 
husband’s brother using violence and threats to force her to marry him, in order to conform 
to the Sena practice of widow inheritance. Her claim recounted the prolonged physical and 
emotional abuse that she had suffered at the hands of her husband, his other wives and his 
immediate family, including them accusing her of being a witch, and her fear of being forced 
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into another violent marriage (AB (Malawi) [2015] NZIPT 800672). Other cases defined the 
PSG much more narrowly. One example of this is a case where the main claimant argued that 
her daughter feared persecution on the basis of belonging to the social group of ‘Nepalese 
female children of fathers who die near the time of their birth’ (N04/49127 [2004] RRTA 703). 
 
Notably there was only one (albeit unsuccessful) case in the entire set of 176 decisions in 
which the decision-maker clearly accepted ‘witch’ as the defining feature of the recognised 
PSG (1202540 [2012] RRTA 473). In that case a Nigerian man claimed that elders in his 
community had accused him of being a witch following the death of his father and the sudden 
death of his cousin in a car crash. As a result, the applicant claimed that community members 
beat and tortured him on a number of occasions to induce him to confess to using witchcraft 
and that the police had refused to intervene. The Australian Tribunal noted that ‘it was willing 
to accept that “witches” (in other words, those perceived by others to be witches) constitute 
a particular social group in Nigeria’. Tellingly, however, the Tribunal rejected the applicant’s 
claim on credibility grounds, including a finding that the claimant was unable to provide 
details of a pastor who had taken him to a church in order to ‘deliver’ him from witchcraft. It 
is strikingly paradoxical that an applicant’s express disinterest in, and knowledge of, local 
exorcism practices, was held to damage the credibility of his claim to a status that was only 
ever imputed to him.  
 
Alongside this sidelining of witchcraft claims in the articulation of the relevant particular social 
group is also an apparent failure, or unwillingness, to explicitly gender the framing of the 
particular social group in the handful of cases that do include reference to witchcraft in the 
framing of the PSG. The case set shows that where an accusation of witchcraft is recognised 
in the framing of the particular social group, that group is often framed in non-gendered 
terms, as a ‘person accused of witchcraft’. This is unlike other particular social groups that 
appeared alongside the accusation of witchcraft claims, which were framed in clearly 
gendered terms such as ‘widow’ or ‘woman fearing domestic violence’ (see eg X (Re), 2011 
CanLII 98327). 
 
In the majority of cases, regardless of how experiences of witchcraft accusations were posed 
by claimants, decisions did not involve any element of witchcraft in the definition of the 
particular social group. Rather, the witchcraft accusations were treated as an incidental factor 
to understanding the particular social group, or subsumed within another social category. 
Advocates and decision-makers articulated the relevant particular social group as, for 
example, ‘widowed women in Uganda in relation to whom a bride price has been paid’ 
(V04/16971 [2005] RRTA 351); ‘persons suffering mental illness in Ghana’ (1219395 [2013] 
RRTA 633); ‘abandoned children of mixed marriage and race’ easily recognised by their 
appearance (1006566 [2010] RRTA 976), ‘children whose grandfather was a cult member’ 
(1006566 [2010] RRTA 976), ‘poor women with HIV/AIDS’ in Haiti (X (Re), 2009 CanLII 47104), 
‘Nepali single women without protection of a male relative and facing economic hardship’ 
(1305413 [2014] RRTA 393), or simply ‘widows in Nepal’ (1207007 [2012] RRTA 1072). This 
framing can be seen, for example, in a 2005 Australian case concerning a widowed Ugandan 
woman who feared being forced to marry her brother-in-law and being subjected to further 
domestic violence (V04/16971 [2005] RRTA 351). Even though the woman noted in her claim 
that her brother-in-law had accused her of being a witch and argued that this ‘elevated the 
risk’ she faced, the decision-maker did not consider this accusation in the written reasoning. 
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Rather, the woman was granted asylum on the basis of the PSG of widowed women in Uganda 
in relation to whom a bride price had been paid. By defining the PSG without reference to 
witchcraft, the accusation of witchcraft falls away from the persecution analysis. 
 
The framing of the PSG to exclude witchcraft is problematic because it can flow through to 
the analysis of nexus and risk.xiv To illustrate, in a 2012 Australian RRT case, a Nepali widow’s 
application for asylum was rejected on the basis that the harms she feared were not deemed 
to be of ‘sufficient seriousness’ to amount to persecution (1207007 [2012] RRTA 1072 [58]). 
Her claim centred on the fact that she would be blamed for the ‘short life’ of her deceased 
husband and would be accused of being a witch (or alakechhini in Nepalese, meaning ‘I do 
not have good fate and I am a witch and I took his life’) by members of his family and the 
community. While the decision-maker accepted that widows in Nepal were discriminated 
against, he did not accept that the claimant’s fears could amount to ‘anything more serious 
than this’ ([54]). Despite the claimant explicitly raising the matter of the potential witchcraft 
accusation, this was not considered in the decision, which instead examined the potential risk 
of persecution primarily in terms of the social ostracism faced by widows in Nepal.  
 
These examples, occurring in both claims framed as PSG and those framed – but largely 
dismissed – as religious, illustrate that the failure to properly characterise the ground of the 
claim, and to understand it as one infused with gender-dimensions, flowed through to flawed 
analysis of risk of persecution and Convention nexus, leading in some cases to highly 
questionable outcomes.   
 
Conclusion 
This article has addressed witchcraft related violence as a neglected and specific sub-set of 
gender related asylum claims; but one which also fits within, and speaks to, a broader 
experience of gendered claims in RSD. The sub-set of cases analysed here involved those in 
which the applicant was accused of witchcraft: these WRV claims were dominated by women, 
with almost two thirds of cases involving female claimants. It was notable that claims by 
women accused of witchcraft were deeply infused with the domestic and relational elements 
common to gendered claims: applicants were typically at risk from family members, often 
triggered by non-conforming behaviour such as marriage refusals. The harms faced were 
commonly domestic violence, forced marriage and rape.  
 
In the entire dataset, covering 176 cases from five jurisdictions determined over 14 years, 
WRV was not recognised as a gendered-related form of harm in and of itself, nor was it 
accepted as a manifestation of religion, and was instead largely excluded, elided, ignored, or 
disbelieved within the RSD process. Even when successful, applicants accused of witchcraft 
tended to be accepted on some other basis within their claim than the witchcraft element. 
Over the time period in which the cases were determined, and most notably from 2000 
onwards, WRV has gained increased attention within international human rights NGOs and 
high level bodies, including UNHCR itself. Yet, in keeping with earlier research on other 
aspects of gendered harm in refugee status determination, such as that on forced marriage, 
this project found that widespread and high level human rights attention in domestic and 
international fora failed to translate into RSD processes and outcomes.  
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The sidelining and erasure of WRV as a form of gender-related harm and as religion based 
persecution, which occurred in both successful and unsuccessful decisions, demonstrates that 
WRV is still largely understood as outside of the scope of protection offered under the 
Refugee Convention. This is a failure of both jurisprudential analysis and of RSD processes. At 
a process level we argue that witchcraft-related claims are emblematic of the ontological 
crisis posed by RSD, as decision-makers struggle with the worldview and lived experiences of 
applicants that are radically different from their own. In exoticising or ignoring witchcraft 
claims, decision-makers divorced understandings of witchcraft and WRV from ‘public’ or legal 
frames and lost sight of fundamental questions such as the proper scope of state protection 
for vulnerable groups under the Convention. We argue that WRV can, and should, be 
recognised as a specific form of gender-related harm by refugee decision-makers. This form 
of harm intersects with other markers of vulnerability and alterity such as age, sexuality, 
marital status, kinship position and disability, but it is grounded in religious understandings 
and practices.  
 
At a fundamental jurisprudential level, WRV fits with the Convention category of religion if it 
is properly understood as concerning communities of religious belief, identity and ways of 
life. As the EC Minimum Standards and UNHCR Guidelines on Religion explicitly state, the 
Convention ground of Religion includes non-theistic beliefs and forms of worship. 
Understandings of witchcraft as diverse and localised experiences of religion, and witchcraft 
related violence as gender-related forms of harm that are grounded in religion, while not a 
panacea,xv would go some way towards bringing WRV into a clearer focus of analysis within 
RSD. The fact that decision-makers are currently failing to apprehend WRV within the frame 
of religion should not deter higher legal challenge to the religion category in future asylum 
claims concerning witchcraft. 
 
In a second related article, we address cases where mostly male applicants claimed protection 
on the basis that they feared harm from sorcerers or witches, or from unknown assailants 
through the medium of witchcraft. Those cases, although sharing many common features 
with those discussed here concerning applicants accused of witchcraft, posed even more 
acute challenges in terms of the application of the religion ground, the framing of the PSG, 
analysis of the objective element of the risk, and in credibility assessment.   
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applicants arose because 5 decisions in the case set consisted of husband and wife co-applicants, where the claims 
of both the male and female had WRV elements. 
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whereas the Canadian tribunal began in 1996. 
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and categorised as ‘positive’ cases in which the outcome sought by the applicant was granted, even though at 
judicial review level this rarely involves a grant of asylum but rather usually lead to a redetermination of status at 
lower level (with result often unknown), this may give an inflated sense of success. Equally, some claims involved 
multiple applicants but are still counted as one case result. Where claims involved two co-claimants of different 
genders, they were excluded for the purpose of calculating gender of the applicant. Where cases involve one main 
claimant and one or more children attached to the application, the gender of the main claimant was been included 
in our calculations of the gender of the applicant. 
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Australian cases were sourced from AustLii (www.austlii.edu.au) and LexisNexis AU; Canadian cases were 
sourced from CanLii (http://www.canlii.org); New Zealand cases were sourced from the Immigration and 
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Of these 46 cases, 29 decisions were from Canada; 8 from Australia; 6 from UK; and 2 from the US.  
 
vii 
There were 11, 11, 13 and 12 cases from these countries, respectively. 
 
viii 
In 2014-15, the Australian Tribunal reported a positive rate of 21 per cent: Refugee Review Tribunal, Annual 
Report 2014-15 (2015) 21 http://www.aat.gov.au/aat/files/MRDAnnualReports/MRTRRTAR201415.pdf In the 
UK in 2010 the Tribunal reported a positive rate of 27 per cent: Home Office, cited in Balliot, Cowan and Munro, 
2012: 272. Localised data obtained under FOI laws concerning decisions in the UK in October 2013 alone showed 





See eg an overall positive rate of 32 per cent in a case set of 120 forced marriage decisions from the same five 
jurisdictions from 1995-2008: Dauvergne and Millbank, 2010: 69; positive rates for sexual orientation claims in 
a data set of 528 Australian and 116 UK decisions from 1994-2007 varying between 22 per cent and 37 per cent: 
Millbank, 2009, and a 50 per cent positive rate in a case set of 42 transgender asylum claims covering the same 
five jurisdictions: Berg and Millbank,  2013: 125. 
 
x 
There were 33 initial decisions and 33 appeal decisions, recollecting that only two cases concerned the same 
claimant on appeal. 
 
xi 
See also X (Re), 2011 CanLII 98327 (CA IRB) (7 February 2011), where the claimant sought asylum on the basis 
of belonging to a PSG of ‘persons accused of witchcraft and women fearing domestic violence’. The decision-
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maker did not accept the witchcraft allegations on the basis of credibility but found the woman’s ‘fear of 
persecution as a victim of domestic violence is well-founded’. Nonetheless, the woman was not granted asylum 
on the basis of an available internal flight option. 
 
xii 
  And see a recent UK appellate decision suggesting that the scope of protection for an imputed ground 
(political opinion) ought to be the same as for the actual belief: SSHD v MSM (Somalia) & UNHCR [2015] UKUT 
00413. As noted below, witches are the paradigmatic example of imputed status in Australian jurisprudence (albeit 
of an imputed PSG) in Applicant A v MIEA (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 265 per McHugh J. 
 
xiii 
  See eg a US decision in which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit states that the applicant’s initial 
claim unsuccessful for asylum was in part on the ground of religion (witchcraft), but does not elaborate beyond 
this: Mekenye v AG of the United States, 445 Fed Appx 593 (2011). See also a 2005 decision in which a Nigerian 
male applicant claimed unsuccessfully that his involvement with a religious organisation, Brotherhood of the 
Cross and Stars (a faith based system incorporating traditional African beliefs in reincarnation with a belief in 
God and Jesus), meant that he would be persecuted by people who believe that he was involved in witchcraft: 
MZWOB v Minister for Immigration [2005] FMCA 310 (17 March 2005) 
xiv 
  This was noted as an appealable error by the Federal Court of Canada in Gyarchie v Canada [2013] FC 
1221 [49] in which the Tribunal had analysed risk only by reference to the domestic violence claims and not by 
reference to the accusations of witchcraft. 
 
xv 
  Of course RSD concerning religious belief has also been the subject of criticism: see eg All Party 
Parliamentary Group for International Freedom of Religion or Belief, Fleeing Persecution: Asylum Claims in the 
UK on Religious Freedom Grounds (2016); and, generally, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Beyond Proof: 
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